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Abstract This article examines the undemocratic process of telecommunications divestment in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The divestment of the telecommunications sector was largely prompted by each state’s inability to
service external debt. Despite espousing the importance of public participation in the ownership of state-owned enterprises being divested, the governments each limited or excluded nationals from ownership of the telephony companies. Divestment of the telecommunications sector was principally undertaken through private negotiations with
Cable and Wireless which has historically provided service to former British colonies. This continued colonization
of the telecommunications sector is at odds with the democratic structure of both states.
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This article examines the process of telecommunications divestment and its effects on the democratic process with distinct reference to Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago. The article initially
explores various factors prompting divestment of
state-owned enterprises, specifically analyzing
the telecommunications sector. It then examines
the process of telecommunications divestment in
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
A SIMILAR SYSTEMS COMPARATIVE
DESIGN
The two island states of the Caribbean were chosen for a comparative case study, a frequently
used policy research method which examines the
process by which an intervention or policy action
has been implemented, since the two countries
possess some notable similarities. This caseoriented comparative research strategy is based
on the premise advocated by Przeworski and
Teune (1982) that systems as similar as possible
with respect to as many characteristics as possible comprise the optimal choices for comparative
inquiry. A similar systems design is a ‘maximum’
strategy for the number of experimental variables,
in this case between the two Caribbean states
chosen for this study, which, while still large,
have been minimized.
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With respective populations less than 5 million, the two small island countries bear many
common cultural attributes and each boasts a relatively high physical quality of life index. The
two countries also fit a similar economic typology, that is, they may both be classified as small,
open economies which also may be described as
mineral economies, given that bauxite in Jamaica
and oil in Trinidad and Tobago have constituted,
at various times, at least 40 percent of each country’s exports. Further, as former British colonies
which both received their independence in 1962,
the countries inherited legal systems which owe
their basic concepts to English common law and
adopted the same political regime type, the
Westminster system of parliamentary government with a prime minister as head of government. Jamaica, like most independent countries
of the Commonwealth Caribbean, retains the
British monarch as the titular head of state represented by a local governor general, whereas Trinidad and Tobago, akin to Guyana, adopted a republican status with a president as head of state.
Despite the democratic nature of these states, the
governments of both Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago limited or excluded the citizens from
participating in the ownership of public or stateowned enterprises in the process of divestment,
as exemplified in the telecommunications sector.
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DEMOCRACY
The nature of a democracy is to promote the process of participation in decisions that affect the
lives of the citizenry and the social goal of moving toward equality. A participatory democracy
is not confined to casting a vote in periodic local
and national elections, which is often little more
than a symbolic gesture of democracy, but, as
Mosco (1989) writes, aims at creating economic
and sociocultural participation and equity. A central feature of a democracy is its public character,
which thus includes public participation in the
economy, as in the divestment or denationalization of state-owned enterprises.
FACTORS PROMPTING DIVESTMENT
The divestment of state-owned enterprises, including telephony companies, has become an increasingly utilized tool of economic reform in
developing countries. Structural adjustment programs prescribed by the World Bank have regularly sought institutional reform of state-owned
enterprises due to their weak economic performance. Hemming and Mansoor (1987) note that
the inefficiency of the public sector is generally
associated with bureaucratic failure and political
interference. The public enterprise is often employed as an instrument for political patronage in
many developing countries. It is thus thought that
privatization, by reducing political interference,
will improve a firm’s efficiency. This rationale
stems from the property rights school which contends that a change to private ownership will improve the incentives for productive efficiency
performance. Management, as opposed to ownership, is arguably, however, the key to efficiency.
Although the long-term goal of privatization may
be economic efficiency, Suleiman and Waterbury
(1990) recognize that the short-term stimulus has
often been deficit reduction. The acquisition of
foreign exchange has not, however, generally
been publicly declared as an objective of divestment. Rather, privatization is touted as a means
to improve the management of state enterprises,
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thus making the transaction more politically palatable.
The shortage of foreign exchange has nonetheless been a compelling motive for many privatization programs, as many developing countries face a limited choice between foreign equity
investment and foreign debt. To scale back the
burgeoning state sector by divesting saleable
public assets to the private sector has been considered by some governments as a means of handling an acute capital shortage and acquiring
funds for debt servicing or capital investments.
For countries whose deficits and debts have
grown beyond control and cannot be reversed by
a continuation of the policy of state ownership,
divestiture has become viewed as a means to
raise revenue and reduce fiscal and credit pressures.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVESTMENT
In regard to the telecommunications sector, many
governments of developing countries are caught
in the quagmire of upgrading an antiquated telecommunications system with modern equipment
at a capital cost beyond their means. It is thought
that private investors with access to commercial
lending sources and expanded credit possibilities
will be better able to provide the capital necessary for the development of the telecommunications infrastructure and the provision of diverse
services. Partners are also sought for their technological and management capabilities. Governments typically seek partners with considerable
experience in building and operating telecommunications networks. The divestment of the telecommunications sector is thus more likely to involve the sale of the enterprise as a complete entity, or, at least, controlling interest is sold to a
foreign telecommunications service provider.
The factors affecting the decision to privatize the
telecommunications sector may vary, but one
aspect of the outcome is virtually universal: the
participation of a foreign investor.
This arrangement limits the ability of the
public, the nationals, to participate in the owner-
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ship of the firm. Public share offerings, in broadening the structure of private ownership, assist in
democratizing the process of divestment. Employee share schemes, though exercised, are often only employed so as to diffuse opposition to
privatization. Since public share offerings are
generally constrained in developing countries by
the thinness of capital markets and the embryonic
stature of the stock exchanges, Howard (1992)
contends that additional efforts must be made to
increase market capacity to handle the float. A
stock market offering directed to the small investor can assist in redistributing wealth in a community through broad-based share ownership.
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) recognize those
policies associated with promoting wider share
ownership, including pricing at substantial discounts to market values, together with measures
like share allocation rules that favour small investors, and inducements for them to hold on to
their shares rather than sell out at a quick profit.
If small shareholders sell their shares within the
first year or so, a concentrated shareholding may
develop. As Cowan (1990) cautions, the number
of shares any one individual may acquire must be
limited to curtail the concentration of ownership
of shares by the wealthy elites, and create a constituency for privatization as well as a ready
market for the nexL offering. The adroit use of
the mass media to explain stockholding, share
purchase and the potential uses of future dividend payments can be employed to create popular support. Public favor of privatization as well
as broad-based share ownership can also be
achieved through the distribution of shares free
of charge, either directly or in the form of vouchers that are redeemable for shares in former stateowned enterprises.
THE PROCESS OF DIVESTMENT IN JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
This people’s capitalism, a process of democratization, was espoused by political parties in both
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The National
Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR, 1986) in
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Trinidad and Tobago stated in their election manifesto that shares in state enterprises to be divested would be offered to workers and their affiliated unions and to local capital. The Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) under Prime Minister Edward
Seaga, too, advocated opportunities for the widest possible share ownership which were to be
facilitated through the stock exchange. The policies of both the NAR and JLP also emphasized
deregulation. The ideological position of the parties conceptualized development in an economy
in which the private sector was seen as the engine of growth. As Mills (1989) notes, the appropriate role for the public sector was deemed
as providing the infrastructural framework to facilitate the efficienl operation of the private sector. This position was also assumed by the People’s National Party (PNP) in Jamaica, which
upon returning to power in 1989 under the prime
ministership of Michael Manley who had been
routed from power in 1980 by the JLP, intensified the privatization policies and marketoriented economic strategies adopted by the opposition. Indeed, as Stone (1992) writes, the policy of divestment represents one of the core areas
of continuity in policy making between the JLP
and PNP in the 1980s and 1990s. Broadening the
base of ownership in the economy, however, was
not retained as a priority in either Jamaica or
Trinidad and Tobago, as evident in the sale of
shares in the state-owned telephone companies in
the two countries.
Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago stipulated in a ‘Letter of Intent’ to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) the divestment of the
state-owned telephone company. To qualify for
IMF assistance, a borrowing country must agree
to implement policy measures set out in these
letters. Although the privatization of state enterprises has been stipulated in lending conditionalities by various external agencies, individual
companies or sectors are not specified. The decision concerning which firms to divest and the
method of divestment rests with the government.
Telecommunications of Jamaica
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The telecommunications sector was originally
chosen for divestment, in the case of Jamaica, in
an attempt to yield funds for the electoral campaign of the reigning administration of the JLP.
The impending national elections required that
Seaga increase public expenditures, particularly
in the areas of roads, health and education. Divestment was employed as a measure to cope
with the budget deficit in an situation where an
increase in expenditure on social services was
deemed indispensable for the government’s political survival. Jamaica’s system of patronage politics thus explains, in large part, the JLP’s decision to divest the telecommunications sector and
the timing of this decision. Indeed, as Stephens
and Stephens (1989) note, in the Budget debate
in the House in May 1988, the year preceding
general elections, Seaga projected that a total of
J$430 million was to come from divestment in
that fiscal year, including J$100 million from
Telecommunications of Jamaica.
The JLP also regarded telecommunications as
a key to encouraging foreign investment and creating a competitive exporting sector linked to the
US economy, and viewed privatization as a
means to upgrade the system by accessing technology, finance and foreign exchange. Arguably,
this view was simply politically astute and a
post-rationalization of the divestment. Regardless
of the validity of this argumentation, limited domestic and foreign capital did curtail expansion
of the telecommunications infrastructure for the
government was restricted in its ability to guarantee funds for capital improvements. Both the
Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC), the domestic telecommunications firm which offered local
or basic telephony service, and Jamaica International Telecommunications (JAMINTEL), the
international carrier, were incorporated into the
government’s budgeting under IMF credit ceilings for state-owned enterprises. Hence, as Adam
et al. (1992) write, the telephony companies
found their capital expenditure plans subject to
vetoes based on quarterly macroeconomic targets
rather than long-term, firm-level planning. The
situation was particularly acute for JTC, since
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restricted expansion of the infrastructure meant
that its penetration rate was contained at a low
level. It was thus recommended by Mayer Matalon, then chairperson of JTC and deputy chairperson of JAMINTEL, that a holding company
for the two firms be created to facilitate privatization.
In early 1987, the government of Jamaica
proposed a merger of JTC and JAMINTEL with
Cable and Wireless Limited (C&W). C&W was
interested in partaking in the holding company as
it held a 49 percent shareholding in JAMINTEL
and its license was to expire in three years.1 Matalon, an ambassador at large traveling under the
same visa as a prime minister, handled these negotiations which were carried out in London in
February 1987. It was agreed that a holding
company, Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (TOJ), be formed to assume the shareholdings of both JAMINTEL and JTC. C&W and the
Jamaican government further agreed to procure
an eventual merger or amalgamation of JTC and
JAMINTEL, which was finally secured via the
Telecommunications of Jamaica (Transfer to and
Vesting of Assets and Liabilities of Jamaica Telephone Company Limited and Jamaica International Telecommunications Limited) Act, 1995.
The actual merger was completed 1 April 1995.
It was also agreed that Matalon would serve as
the chairperson of TOJ which acquired controlling interest in JAMINTEL on 19 May 1987 and
in JTC on 23 July 1987. According to the Accountant General (1988), both JAMINTEL and
JTC were wholly owned subsidiaries of TOJ
which became a public company on 1 July 1987.
Although C&W, on account of its shares in
JAMINTEL, initially held only 9 percent of the
holding company, it was agreed, as reported by
Telecommunications of Jamaica (1990), that
C&W would be permitted to acquire additional
shares from the Jamaican government to enable
the company to own 20 percent of the company.
According to the former president of TOJ, C.
Chantrielle (pers. comm., 22 September 1993),
C&W was allowed to increase its shareholding to
20 percent as the company could not otherwise
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reflect its investment in TOJ in its balance sheets
due to stipulations in its own corporate act.
While it has been contended that 80 percent of
TOJ was to be owned by Jamaicans or Jamaican
interests (‘Move to Merge’, 1989), in October
1987, according to the Accountant General
(1988), C&W acquired a further 19 percent of
the issued share capital of TOJ, giving the firm a
39 percent interest in TOJ. The JLP sold the
shares to acquire funds for the international net
reserves.
The next year, in September 1988, the JLP
made a public offering of shares by placing 13
percent of the government’s shares for sale on
the Jamaica stock exchange. According to R.
Downer (pers. comm., 14 September 1993) of
Price Waterhouse, the amount of shares was limited so as not to flood the market. The Accountant General offered 126.5 million ordinary shares
of J$1.00 each to the public at J$0.88 per share.
Applications for the shares, which had to be paid
in full on application, could only be made by Jamaican residents or bodies corporate, incorporated or registered in Jamaica and controlled by
Jamaican citizens. Although there was no limit to
the maximum number of shares for which an applicant could apply, applications had to be made
for a minimum of 200 shares. In making the public share offering, the Seaga administration reputedly sought a broader based share ownership
in TOJ, yet the minimal share specification is at
odds with the JLP objective of wide share ownership, for the majority of the citizens could ill
afford this number of shares. The exception to
this stipulation was the employee share scheme.
The Accountant General (1988) reports that
of the shares placed on the stock market, about 2
percent were reserved under an employee share
scheme. The National Workers Union (NWU),
which has represented the staff union of JAMINTEL since its inception in 1971 and that of
the JTC for the past few decades, negotiated the
employee share scheme. According to the president of the NWU, C. Dobson (pers. comm., 30
September 1993), there was not enough capital to
demand more than 2 percent of the shares. Em-
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ployee share offerings have been used in various
countries, such as Mexico, as a way to include
workers in the economic participation of the new
firm and to counter their opposition to the privatization.
Following the offering on the Jamaican stock
exchange, the public held 19 percent of the
shares. Spike (1992) writes that nearly 15,000
investors, of a resident population of some 2.5
million, applied for the shares offered on the
stock exchange, raising, as Scaga had projected,
nearly J$120 million in the process. The government of Jamaica and C&W reflected a mirrored shareholding profile with 40 percent and 39
percent respectively. It was not the intention of
the JLP, as written in the prospectus, to reduce
the government’s shareholding below 40 percent.
The PNP, however, in June 1989, privately
negotiated an additional sale of 20 percent of the
government’s shares to C&W. C&W thus became the majority shareholder with 59 percent of
the shares. Then, in November 1990, the Manley
administration sold its remaining shares in TOJ,
20 percent, to C&W. The British corporation’s
shareholding, thus, stood, as it remains to date, at
79 percent.
There was a great deal of public criticism of
these arrangements. Indeed, it would have been
politically sensitive to democratize the divestment process through a public share offering or,
at the very least, by making the additional shares
available to existing shareholders. Nonetheless,
the PNP excused its actions by stating that it
found it necessary to dispose of its remaining
shares in order to secure foreign exchange to
support the foreign exchange requirements of the
Jamaican economy.
Jamaica’s foreign debt had steadily increased
during the 1980s. According to Ramsaran (1992),
in 1980 it amounted to US$1.9 billion or 57 percent of GNP. By 1989, the World Bank (1992)
calculated that the total debt stocks had grown to
US$4.5 billion or 129 percent of GDP, making it
one of the world’s most severely indebted countries on a per capita basis. McAfee (1991) notes
that Seaga borrowed more during his first two
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years in office than previous administrations had
borrowed in the entire preceding decade. Despite
the fact that US assistance, which had dropped to
US$2.6 million in 1979, Manley’s last year in
office, had increased to US$69.5 million in 1982
(‘US/Caribbean’, 1982), making Jamaica one of
the fifth highest per capita recipients of US aid,
Seaga amassed an unmanageable debt. Debt servicing, which, arguably, receives higher priority
than the expansion of the capital base, has proven
problematic for Jamaica and has resulted in the
suspension of successive IMF agreements as the
government fails to adhere to IMF conditionalities and pass performance tests.
In order to have a standby agreement with the
IMF reinstated in 1991, Manley agreed to meet
various IMF targets, including the clearing of
debt arrears to official and private creditors. It
was in Manley’s attempts to secure the requisite
foreign exchange to meet IMF targets that the
shares were sold to C&W. The additional TOJ
sales were not part of a broader philosophy regarding the sector. Furthermore, as the minister
responsible for Public Utilities, R. Pickersgill
(pers. comm., 28 September 1993) notes, the
timetable to meet the IMF targets was too tight to
permit the process of public share offerings. The
sales of shares are thus indicative of a crisis
management approach to government. The PNP
expended political capital in its haste to obtain
foreign exchange. At this time, the Jamaica stock
exchange, too, took issue with a clause in the
prospectus, which it had not approved, that indicated the government’s intention to not further
reduce its shareholding.
C&W was, moreover, not particularly interested in purchasing the last 20 percent of the
government’s shares since the company was already the majority shareholder. Matalon, who,
sources reveal, holds close personal ties with
both Manley and senior officers in C&W, persuaded C&W to purchase the additional shares.
Matalon arranged the sale to C&W with the understanding that the archaic 1893 Telephone Act
would be rewritten to reflect new technological
developments and the powers of the license
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would be widened. According to various sources,
including the attorney for TOJ, T. Patterson (pers.
comm., 17 September 1993), Manley wrote a
personal letter promising these arrangements.
Although C&W would have preferred to wait
until the legislation was passed before actually
buying the shares, the IMF targets were too near
and the foreign exchange was needed immediately by the Jamaican government, so the company
agreed to comply. The PNP sold each 20 percent
block of shares to C&W for US$42 million, a
price comparable to that paid by C&W for 49
percent of the telephony system in Trinidad and
Tobago.
Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and
Tobago
The process of divestment and the resultant
shareholding structure in Trinidad and Tobago
differs from that of Jamaica in several notable
respects, including the absence of a public share
offering and employee share scheme. The reasons for the actual sale of shares are analogous,
however, in that the government was in need of
foreign exchange to service external debt obligations and build the international net reserves. The
inclusion of a foreign partner in the telecommunications sector was not actually part of a broader reform strategy, though the situation may thus
be post-rationalized, as former chair of the telephony company board, K. Hudson-Philips (pers.
comm., 5 November 1993) notes.
The structure of the telecommunications sector in Trinidad and Tobago parallels that of Jamaica. TELCO, the Trinidad and Tobago Telephone Company, corresponds to JTC as
TEXTEL, the Trinidad and Tobago External Telecommunications Company, corresponds to JAMINTEL. Also, as in JAMINTEL, C&W held 49
percent of TEXTEL and its license was soon to
expire. This accounts, in part, for its ownership
presence in Telecommunications Services of
Trinidad and Tobago (TSTT), which was created
soon after the divestment of TELCO with the
merger of TELCO and TEXTEL.
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Unlike Jamaica, however, the domestic carrier in Trinidad and Tobago had undertaken a massive network expansion and development program which spanned 1981 -6. The expansion was
based on general economic growth and accompanying growth in the customer rate base. TELCO’s investment was geared toward a much
higher level of economic activity in the country.
TELCO financed the entire costly program with
loans, much of them commercial, for the government had authorized the company to borrow
money commercially in 1981. According to
TSTT (1991), the bulk of the financing for the
development program was secured through the
Bank of Commerce in Canada, the Export Development Corporation, also of Canada, the Export-Import or EXIM Bank of the USA and a
Japanese consortium led by Sumitomo Bank.
TELCO procured a government-guaranteed debt
of several million US dollars. Its debt stood at
TT$981,125 million in 1986 when the exchange
rate was TT$2.40 to US$1.00, reports Pannell
Kerr Forster Chartered Accountants (1987). In
1986 its medium and long-term borrowings represented more than 70 percent of total assets, and
this figure excludes short-term local financing
(TELCO, 1988a).
The decline of the Trinidadian economy had,
moreover, reached crisis proportions by this time.
The unraveling of the economy in the 1980s is
largely attributed to decreased oil earnings due to
the depressed state of the international oil market
since 1982, an exogenous factor, and declining
oil production. The government, that is, the People’s National Movement (PNM) under Eric Williams (Prime Minister, 1962-81) and George
Chambers (Prime Minister, 1981-6) also mismanaged the petroleum export-led economy during the economic upswing. The PNM failed to
mobilize its oil revenue to diversify and increase
the internal dynamics of other sectors of the
economy. It also failed to curb expenditures during the boom period and prepare for adverse
price and production changes.
Although TELCO began to scale down its investment program with the downturn in the Trin-
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idadian economy and thus did not utilize all of
the external loans, the company still found itself
unable to service its debt which was among the
highest of the country’s state enterprises. Unfortunately, while most of the infrastructure of
TELCO’s development program was laid by
1986, resulting in a marked improvement in costefficiency and quality of service, the company
was in poor economic health. It faced high debtservicing costs at a time when the economy suffered severe contraction and Chambers had issued a directive that state enterprises were to be
self-financing. Further, currency devaluations
had the effect of increasing the company’s debtservicing obligations on foreign borrowings. Despite approved rate increases by the Public Utilities Commission in 1983 and 1985 of 100 percent and 20 percent respectively, the company
was crippled by the devaluations. The debt,
which had to be paid in hard currency, grew unmanageable. The coalition government of the
NAB, which had won the elections of 1986,
therefore sought a means to refinance TELCO.
In September 1987, TELCO appointed Morgan Grenfell and Co. to serve as financial and
technical advisors and assist in implementing a
restructuring program which included the introduction of a private equity investor to subscribe
to an issue of new shares, the rescheduling of the
company’s loans and a merger with TEXTEL.
Morgan Grenfell arranged for international advertising for a firm to subscribe to 49 percent of
the total issued share capital. Following receipt
of the ‘Information Memorandum’ dated February 1988, several firms indicated interest in the
shares (TELCO, 1988c). One attraction of TELCO for foreign investors was that the company
received a large loss provision for tax purposes.
Four companies, Atlantic Tele Network Inc.
(ATN), British Telecom (BT), C&W and Telefonica of Spain, submitted offers (TELCO,
1988b). While this open bidding process may be
considered democratic for the foreign corporations, it utterly ignored the internal dynamics of
democracy by excluding public participation.
This undemocratic practice was also contrary to
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the NAR election manifesto, which was adopted
as a policy document by the Cabinet, and, as noted, stated that shares in state enterprises to be
divested would be offered to workers and their
affiliated unions and to local capital.
Only two offers, those of BT and C&W, were
seriously considered. The government was attracted to BT since the company, unlike other
firms, develops technology and was willing to
buy C&W’s shares in TEXTEL which would be
available for another company to purchase as its
license was due to expire. The government
deemed it advisable that the same foreign investor own shares in TELCO and TEXTEL in order
to facilitate a merger. C&W, in response to the
‘Information Memorandum’, indicated in its letter, dated 16 February 1988, to Audley Walker,
then chair of TELCO, its interest and willingness
to participate in the restructuring of the country’s
internal and external telecommunications service
providers. In addition to its familiarity with the
telecommunications sector, the corporate and
government culture and political players and
process in Trinidad and Tobago, C&W placed a
higher bid than BT for the shares. C&W thus
succeeded in marketing its services and secured
the shares in TELCO.
C&W purchased the 49 percent of TELCO’s
shares for US$85 million, the first payment of
US$50 million was made in December 1989 and
the balance paid in April 1990. At the then prevailing rate of exchange of TT$4.25 to US$1.00,
the purchase price equaled approximately
TT$360 million which was far less than TELCO’s TT$900 million investment expenditure.
Further, TELCO’s loans were rescheduled in
1989. TSTT acquired TELCO’s debt with the
merger and was allowed to carry TELCO’s losses in its books, deducting or applying the losses
against earnings or profits. TSTT also did not
have to pay corporate taxes until the fiscal year
1994-5 when the TT$900 million debt was liquidated. It can thus be deemed that C&W did very
well in terms of its purchase of TELCO. Further,
in comparison with Jamaica to whom it paid a
comparable price for the last 40 percent of shares
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in TOJ, C&W acquired a technically superior
system in Trinidad and Tobago. In this light, the
investment in Jamaica may appear illogical until
one considers the telecommunication shareholdings of C&W throughout the region and the consequential control which the company can thus
exercise. An acquisition cannot be assessed
strictly on the basis of the individual firm, but
must be viewed within the context of how this
piece fits into a larger corporate puzzle.
Regional holdings of C&W
The antecedents of C&W, the early telecommunications tentacles of the 19th-century British
imperial state, are a principal factor for the continued dominance of C&W in operating telecommunications systems in former British colonies. C&W has consolidated its corporate strategy by focusing its efforts on areas where the
company is already entrenched. According to the
executive chair of C&W (C&W, 1993), Lord
Young, this approach has resulted in ‘the concept
of three regional hubs in Asia, Western Europe
and the Caribbean, creating clusters of businesses
in order to exploit the benefits of regional mass’.
C&W presently owns shares of the telecommunications systems in 15 Caribbean countries,
all former British colonies. C&W has acquired
the image of a local company through hiring local staff and directors and by employing ‘national’ names for the subsidiary companies. The
names of these ‘national’ telecommunications
companies, that is Telecommunications of Jamaica, Telecommunications Services of Trinidad
and Tobago, may well be considered misnomers.
C&W refers to these companies as business units.
It is also interesting to note how the corporate
strategy of C&W adjusts to each specific environment, as the company advocates competition
in the UK while staunchly defending its monopoly position in the Caribbean. C&W also owns,
albeit often in conjunction with other firms, undersea fiber optic cable transmission networks in
the region as well as satellite earth stations.
C&W can route traffic in such a way as is most
profitable to it, not the individual ‘national’
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companies. It thereby treats the national companies in the region as satellite companies, not as
separate and distinct companies in their own
right. Further, regulatory provisions in neither
Jamaica nor Trinidad and Tobago require that
C&W provide universal service which is based
on democratic principles.
Union opposition
This erosion of the democratic process, of national sovereignty and economic independence,
is of great concern to the Communications
Workers Union (CWU) of Trinidad and Tobago.
The CWU, which represented both TELCO and
TEXTEL staff, vehemently objected to the restructuring of TELCO’s authorized share capital,
the conversion of the company’s debt into equity
and to the subsequent purchase by C&W of 49
percent of the shares. The CWU, writes Townsend (1990), was also critical of the merger of
TELCO and TEXTEL due to the involvement of
C&W which it considered a recolonization of the
industry and not representational of the country.
The CWU was not involved in the negotiations
nor party to the shareholders’ agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
In both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, divestment of the telecommunications sector was
principally undertaken through private negotiations with C&W which has historically provided
telecommunications service to the former British
colonies of the Caribbean. This continued colonization or neo-colonization of the telecommunications sector is at odds with the democratic
structure of the state in Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago. Political parties in both countries
stressed the importance of public participation in
the ownership of state-owned enterprises being
divested; however, the governments failed to fully enact such measures.
Although the JLP did make a public share offering of 13 percent of the shares in TOJ and reserved 2 percent of the shares for an employee
share scheme, the PNP made no such offerings
10!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 1997!

and sold the government’s remaining 40 percent
of shares to C&W. The private negotiations with
C&W for these shares were handled by Matalon,
the chair of the TOJ board, a situation which
poses an obvious conflict of interest and testifies
to the power of the elite. Matalon’s influence further extends to nepotism in the appointment of
his son to the TOJ board. This situation is akin to
that in Trinidad and Tobago where C&W recommended the current chair of the TSTT board,
Charles Jacelon, who had previously been hired
by C&W to advise it in negotiating with the government for the purchase of shares in TELCO.
Although privatization is recommended in response to problems in the public sector, problems
which include political interference, it would appear that political considerations continue to
dominate board appointees, regardless of divestment. Political, not public, considerations have
governed the entire denationalization process.
The NAR, which had stipulated in its policy platform that shares in state enterprises to be divested would be offered to workers and their affiliated unions and to local capital, utterly disregarded
the public in the privatization of TELCO. There
was a complete breakdown in the democratic
process as the CWU was not consulted and neither an employee share scheme nor a public offering of shares was made available.
In both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago it
appears that successive administrations mismanaged the government, as evident in the significant accumulation of foreign debt. The inability
to service external debt obligations was the primary factor prompting both states to divest the
telecommunications sector. Divestment is not a
long-term solution to debt-servicing difficulties.
To employ this short-sighted approach to what
are essentially long-term, structural problems
will not increase the productive capacity of either
state. The balance of trade deficit will be maintained and the future socioeconomic development and democratic principles of each state
jeopardized. Telecommunications divestment in
both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago has essentially been an undemocratic process as the
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public was effectively restricted in its ability to
participate in the ownership of the firms being
privatized. In each country, C&W became the
corporate beneficiary of internal deficiencies.
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FOOTNOTES
1. JAMINTEL was formed as a limited liability
company in January 1971 with an ownership
structure in which the Jamaican government held
51 percent of the issued capital and C&W 49
percent. The company, which provided telex, telegram and facsimile services, data access and
leased circuits, was originally created with the
understanding that the government could use the
profits to buy out C&W. The profits, however,
were not employed by the government to purchase the shares and over time the value of the
company increased to the point that the government could not afford the shares.
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